Re: Bytecode abuse in Lua 5.2 (-work4)

[KHMan <keinhong@...>]

On 8/22/2010 7:37 PM, HyperHacker wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 05:17, KHMan wrote:
> > On 8/22/2010 7:05 PM, Martin Guy wrote:
> > > [snip snip snip]
> > > With Lua being embedded in every conceivable program, browser, photo
> > > editor and web game, a security hole like this would be about as much
> > > fun as the eternal security holes in flash player. A wise response
> > > from the Lua dev community would be to reinstate the bytecode sanity
> > > checking by default, and if removing it has significant advantages
> > > (code size, speed) allowing it to be disabled only #ifdef
> > > FAST_AND_FURIOUS
> >
> > "reinstate the bytecode sanity checking by default"?
> >
> > No you got it all wrong, the point is, there is currently no bulletproof
> > bytecode checker, hence the old one has been withdrawn. It is vulnerable, as
> > amply demonstrated. Peter has been at the forefront of this issue. A really
> > good bytecode verifier will need some very, very serious work.
> >
> > It is easy to hope for simple solutions to loading outside code, but like
> > all security problems, there are a lot of wide-ranging issues to look into.
>
> In any case where security is critical, shouldn't scripts not be
> allowed to load (or generate) bytecode at all? IIRC load had a
> parameter added to prevent it for exactly this reason. That's a much
> saner solution than trying to prevent arbitrary code from being
> malicious.

Precisely, you whatever necessary in a sandbox, various details 
are available on the Lua wiki. Those unsure should read Peter's 
posting again. He has demonstrated many ways of breaking the 
bytecode verifier in the past.

Performance is not really a big issue if one thinks practically. A 
very middling PC can load minimal-whitespace Lua source text from 
memory at a rate of at least 4MB/sec.

So no loading untrusted bytecode if there is a need for trust...

--
Cheers,
Kein-Hong Man (esq.)
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia